Somalia and a mission on the rocks

The UN-mandated African Union peacekeeping force in Somalia has long seemed inadequate considering the enormous significance of the situation for the region, the continent and the wider international community. In recent years the Somali conflict has risked spilling over into neighbouring states, stoked fears of a new base of operations for Islamist terror groups and given rise to an endemic piracy problem. However, whilst on one level the force deployed there presents an optimistic sign of African nations helping to stabilise others nearby, the real picture is unstable, unpredictable and this weeks events would suggest - unsustainable.

Set up in 2007 to support the transitional government, the peacekeeping force consists almost solely of Ugandan and Burundian troops. The involvement of these states has come at a significant cost- loosing soldiers on the ground and facing retribution at home. Yet it is highly unlikely that such sacrifices are being made in the name of altruism, stability or horror at the human rights abuses committed by the Islamist militias they are taking on. It is far more probable that the real motivation lies in a combination of politicking and gain - one which is currently beginning to unravel in dramatic fashion.

Uganda's contribution has long provided despot Yoweri Museveni with a means of diverting attention away from his own horrific human rights abuses and destabilising role in Central Africa. The likes of the USA and UK are determined to prevent militant Islamists from gaining control of Somali yet are understandably reluctant to become physically embroiled on the basis of public pressure, over-stretched resources and psychological scars from previous US intervention. American bombing raids during 2008 were as far as any 'Western' power was prepared to go - so Museveni's willingness to 'put troops on the ground' was naturally seen in Washington and London as a golden opportunity- not to be jeopardised by condemning his authoritarian rule.

However, in the face of increased public and political opposition to his rule at home, continued losses of troops and open criticism from the international community regarding his government's barbaric treatment of homosexuals - Museveni is faltering. His threat this week to pull Ugandan forces out if the UN-mandate of the transitional government is not extended, undoubtedly comes less from concern for Somalia's stable development and more from a calculated desire to create a feasible exit strategy whilst sending a message to the world about the dangers in discontinuing appeasement of his regime.

And whilst the complex and cynical politics of Museveni begin to play out- all is not well amongst the Burundian part of the force. Troops claim that they have not been paid for some five months, underscoring the greed and corruption of President Pierre Nkurunziza's administration whilst giving credence to long-standing fears that Burundi's involvement was only ever a method for the political elite to cream off money from the UN (as well as arms from donor nations). With no sign of urgent rectification forthcoming, the potential for Burundian troops to withdraw, desert or even mutiny is by no means off the cards.

Ominously as Uganda and Burundi commit roughly 50% of the force each- neither could feasibly continue the mission without the other- meaning that if either of these situations develops into withdrawal, the whole peacekeeping venture will be likely to collapse.

It is widely agreed that productive, well-executed peacekeeping and stabilisation now is infinitely preferable to further breakdown of order, regional warfare or full scale US intervention at a later date- all of which are conceivable possibilities. However, the execution of the mission so far has been carried out by corrupt and authoritarian governments, fulfilling a good mandate for personal gain. That set-up is now starting to show signs of breaking apart...it is essential that something much better replaces it.

There comes a time for intervention

If there was ever a clear-cut case for military intervention it is the crisis unfolding in the Ivory Coast right now.

Since loosing the presidential election on 28th incumbent Laurent Gbago has held onto control of the West African nation through force; despatching death squads to murder opponents and troops to surround the hotel where Alassane Ouattara - the rightful winner –is residing. As of today 11 000 refugees have fled across the Liberian border to escape the violence. Thousands more expected to follow them over the coming days. What is presently a political and humanitarian crisis looks set to imminently develop into civil war.

The United Nations Peacekeeping force overseeing the state’s peace process (which was set to cumulate with this election) has been ordered by Ggbago to leave, but has rightly refused. As recognised by Secretary General Ban Ki Moon and most member states – Mr. Ouattara is now the only one who can legitimately call for its withdrawal. Fearing for his peoples’ lives as well as his own- he understandably wants the force to remain. Given the circumstances, upon his request it could legally be bolstered by African Union or extra UN troops, including national forces under the formal command of either organisation.

This would be a morally justifiable act as well. The inevitable comparisons with the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq that will be drawn by some the minute that the word ‘intervention’ is mentioned, immediately fall flat. This would be a mandated mission under the auspices of a regional or international grouping to enforce the result of a democratic election at the request of its victor; not the ill thought out, quasi-unilateral removal of entrenched regimes with no viable alternatives. The age-old mantra of ‘pushing our will on other nations’ is also terminally fallacious when the majority of that nation’s public have formally exercised their democratic rights –under national laws, no less- to elect a leader who requests military assistance from the international community.

This leaves only the ancient and somewhat racist objection so often trotted out by those on the right that ‘we shouldn’t waste our resources and troops’ lives in the business of other states.’ However, such sentiment falters (even when laying aside the its bigoted rejection of international society and universal human rights) given the magnitude of what the situation in the Ivory Coast means for Africa – and consequently the entire world.

In 2007 the will of the Kenyan people was rejected by incumbent president Mwai Kibaki, who lost yet held onto the reigns of power by sending armed troops and thugs with machetes onto the streets. The following year Robert Mugabe, heading for electoral defeat, orchestrated a campaign of murder and intimidation against the Movement for Democratic Change, entrenching his rule once more. In 2011 Africa will see more elections than in any single year since decolonisation. Unless the succession of defeated leaders writing-off election results at the barrel of a gun is brought to an end, the message will go out that the international community will sit idly by should this happen again and consequently -in all likelihood -very little will change. Then, without democracy or good governance, millions of people across the continent will continue to face political violence, poverty, food shortages, water shortages and uncontrollable pandemics.

So to those who’d argue against military intervention sanctioned by Ouattara, on the basis that it is somehow ‘imperialist’ I say this: there is nothing wrong with militarily supporting a democratically elected leader when he asks for assistance in upholding peace and human rights. And for those whose objections would rest upon the misplaced conception that the Ivory Coast’s crisis is the Ivory Coast’s problem I offer this consideration: the political ramifications of Ggbago holding power could condemn a continent to poverty for decades to come…poverty that will require aid from the international community, that will close off trade options for the international community, that will spread diseases which have no respect for borders and that will provide fertile breeding grounds for terrorists seeking to spread their destruction across the globe. And that is everyone’s problem.

Haiti and the politics of cholera

No one expected Haiti’s reconstruction after the devastating earthquake in January to be quick or easy. However, the outbreak of cholera currently sweeping through the crowded refugee camps and ruined cities (that as of today has killed 1250 and affected 20 000 more) has struck an unanticipated and utterly crippling blow against on-going relief efforts. Low levels of education and sanitation mean that the disease, though deemed “easily preventable”, is spreading at an alarming pace; whilst the nation’s medical infrastructure –which has not even been rebuilt to its inadequate pre-earthquake standard, is unable to cope.

It’s little wonder therefore, that suggestions the outbreak may have stemmed from Nepalese members of the UN Peacekeeping Force (due to latrine discharges in their camp), have unleashed a torrent of public rage against the blue-helmets. As biological evidence emerged that the strain originated from South Asia, Peackeepers were stoned and violent anti-UN riots spread throughout the country. Return fire killing two of the rioters only stoked anger further.

Yet beyond the understandable fear and resentment, there are other factors at play. UN troops are in Haiti to provide a secure situation in which reconstruction can take place – not to provide it themselves; yet poor conveyance of this fact to the local population has resulted in an inevitable bewilderment and bitterness amongst those who –living in abject poverty and struggling for survival on a daily basis- see the soldiers cruising around in armoured cars whilst apparently doing nothing to help them. This week when the floodgates opened, this built-up tension manifested itself in violence.

Additionally, some factions of the rioters begun to target the offices of candidates involved in Haiti’s upcoming presidential election [see picture right]. Although some of the front runners have called for the poll’s postponement- it is still scheduled to go ahead and from such a volatile situation there is a genuine danger that the kind of political violence which blighted Haiti for decades may emerge once again. Indeed, some commentators have already suggested that the worst of the rioting may have been deliberately orchestrated in a bid to destabilise the vote – a theory strengthened by simultaneous outbreaks of violence at 6am last Monday.

Stopping the riots must now be a priority. Attacks on clinics, medics and body collectors are directly undoing any progress made in the urgent fight against the spread of cholera; whilst a delay in the election will only hold-up the kind of political stability required for real improvements in healthcare, infrastructure and aid spending so that Haiti can respond better to epidemics in the future. Of course this does not mean simply a military response to bolster law and order; a full and public enquiry by the UN as well as serious reforms to the structure their peacekeeping mission are essential if trust is to be restored. This is especially important considering that the troops are likely to be in Haiti for some time yet. Of course, progress on the peacekeeping front should be coupled with urgent education on how to prevent the spread (something that President Préval has already thrown himself into through special TV appearances) and international support in terms of medicine and finance.

The epidemic is expected to peak at the end of next week but the damage to Haiti’s society, political climate and above all its population will go on and on. The reconstruction is about to become longer and harder still.

Peacekeeping, failure and hope

Undeniably international peacekeeping missions receive more attention when they go wrong. Though most people have heard of the UN's failings in states such as Rwanda and Bosnia where thousands were massacred as the blue helmets floundered (sometimes because of politicians, sometimes because of those on the ground), far fewer can recall the relatively successful missions in conflict zones such as Macedonia, Cyprus and post-occupation East Timor.

However, disproportionate coverage aside, it is clear that after hundreds of interventions around the world, the disappointment and sense of failure is, at least in part, justified. The horrifying mass-rape in Eastern Congo this week took place just miles from United Nations Peacekeepers. Hundreds of women and baby boys were brutalised by militias - yet armed the armed force whose sole purpose is to protect the Democratic Republic of Congo's population did nothing to intervene. An emergency meeting has been called and officials have produced heated rhetoric about bringing the perpetrators to justice; but this will mean little to those whose lives have been torn apart by the barbaric act and does nothing to rectify the fact that the peacekeepers did not help them in their hour of need.

Unfortunately this is just the latest is a long line of failings that have befallen the UN's Congo mission. A lack of resources and troops (exacerbated by the state's enormous size), impotence in the face of what reports are now suggesting amounts to genocide, and sexual abuse by peacekeepers against the very people they are meant to be protecting, have all left the force understandably unpopular with the local population and have raised questions over whether their presence has really improved the situation. Of course there have been successes - many militias have been disarmed, the armies of neighbouring states have largely departed and significant areas are now at relative peace. However, given the potential might of the UN and the force's presence in the DRC for over a decade, it is hard to view it as anything other than a failure.

In stark contrast, proposals over the last couple of weeks for an OSCE deployment to Kyrgyzstan, have raised hopes of a far more successful kind of peacekeeping operation. In response the horrendous ethnic clashes that killed over 2000 people in June, the OSCE intends to send 52 well trained police officers to assist fledging constabularies in specific regions. Small and tokenistic as this may sound, it could have a remarkable effect.

If they have a clear mandate (something that was never established for the Congo peacekeepers) the officers will be in a better position to draft in extra resources and exercise their powers in response to the situation on the ground. By working in an advisory/training capacity they are more likely to been seen as friends rather than enemies or occupiers by the local population. And by focusing on policing rather than military peacekeeping they can potentially prevent conflict in its early stages- rather than exacerbating it or attempting to placate it once it is already out of control.

Of course, it's hard to compare such a specifically targeted operation to the Congo mission, which involved entering a state the size of Western Europe engaged in full scale civil war with multiple domestic militias and foreign armies. But if the OSCE mission is a success it will demonstrate once again that, though we're still far from getting it right, international peacekeeping missions can and do work; and that as intergovernmental organisations explore and expand ways in which they can halt conflict and human rights abuses, be it through policing, training, monitoring or some other means - we can eventually prevent failures such as those in Rwanda, Bosnia and the Democratic Republic of Congo from ever happening again.