Monday, 11 April 2011

Syria- when Friday comes

Some three weeks after open dissent first broke out on the streets of Syria, the outpouring of opposition to the four decade long rule of the Assad family and the Ba’ath party is continuing to gather pace. Demonstrations that begun in the South have now spread throughout the country, reaching suburbs of Damascus and long-oppressed Kurdish regions. As vast areas grind to a halt amid the unrest and the state apparatus channels its entire energy towards maintaining control – some commentators are beginning to question just how secure President Bashar al-Assad really is.

Certainly he is not about to go the way of Ben-Ali or Mubarak; not just yet at least. It should not be forgotton that the Assad family has faced-down equally if not more serious challenges to its rule before – such as an armed insurgency by Islamist rebels in the city of Hama during 1982, to which Bashar’s father Hafiz responded by massacring anywhere between ten thousand and eighty thousand people – mainly civilians. Shortly after taking power in 2000, Bashar himself crushed the Damascus Spring, a widespread peaceful push for democracy led by academics and dissident members of the Majlis al-Sha'ab (parliament), by locking up scores of the main protagonists. Mistreatment of these political prisoners including solitary confinement, torture, beatings and hard labour was widely reported- sending a clear signal to those who sought to undermine the regime and effectively snuffing out the vibrant web of debate and dissent that had begun to form.

Beyond this track-record, the high-stakes of Syrian ethnic and religious politics further underscore just how hard the challenge facing the opposition is. The Assad family are Alawite: a minority religious sect technically regarded as apostasy in Sunni Islam, the form to which the majority of Syrians subscribe. This has created something of a ‘siege mentality’ amongst the regime, involving substantive patronage for fellow Alawites and a willingness to take drastic measures in the retention of power. Senior troops and government officials will therefore be far less likely to defect and far more likely to continue the history of repression, than their Tunisian or Egyptian counterparts.

In spite of these factors though, the potential of this current wave of opposition should not be underestimated; not least because of its significant differences to previous incidents. Unlike the Hama Uprising these protests involve a broad mix of Syrian groups including democrats, young people and ethnic minorities as well as more Islamist-leaning citizens and are taking place on a national rather than a local level, giving them far more opportunity for growth and making them much harder to control. They are also more physical than the Dam
ascus Spring- which mainly centred around discussions, open letters and ‘salons’ where political issues were debated, rather than street protests and riots. Furthermore the success of democratic revolutionaries elsewhere in the Arab world will provide the kind of hope that those seeking reform have not experienced before – a psychological encouragement that must not be written off.

Thi
s has clearly been recognised by Bashar al-Assad and his henchmen, who in addition to dishing out their usual brand of thuggery – shooting demonstrators, denying medical aid and cutting off lines of communication; have unusually made widely publicised concessions to various groups involved in the protests. Overtures to Islamists have included closing down a controversial casino, reversing a ban on teachers wearing the Niqab and reinstating those fired for this; whilst in an unprecedented move members of the long-abused Kurdish population in the region of Hasaka have been granted citizenship, a basic right they were previously denied. On one level these are largely irrelevant – dismissed by many commentators as posturing of little real significance and rejected by many demonstrators for not going far enough. However, they are illustrative of a fear within the Assad-camp and potentially a realisation that physical force on its own will not be enough to quell the growing dissent.

Things can still develop in a number of ways and it would be unwise to speculate whether Syria will see a Bahraini-style restoration of order through deadly force or an Egyptian-style destabilisation of the ruling regime. For now Bashar al-Asad’s control –exercised through the military and police- remains firm; but cracks are beginning to show. Like other the Arab states touched by this wave of revolution, Friday has been the focus for mass protests in Syria and this week looks set to be no exception. For the government -and the protestors- the stakes this time aroundcould not be higher.

Thursday, 7 April 2011

Thailand’s Unforgivable Crime

Two months on from the latest round fighting between Thailand and Cambodia over the 11th Century Preah Vihear Temple, Thai authorities have finally confessed what activists long suspected: they used cluster munitions during the conflict.

For those unaware of how these weapons work, the essence is as follows: a large shell releases dozens of smaller shrapnel-filled submunitions or ‘bomblets’ that scatter over a vast area, exploding and causing serious damage to anything in their vicinity.  The major problems with this are twofold: firstly those deploying the weapons have no control over their exact dispersal and secondlyCluster Bomb Submunitions many submunitions fail to explode on impact, yet remain live, effectively becoming landmines.  Thus whilst troops may utilise cluster munitions with no explicit intent of harming civilians, they cannot avoid ripping apart innocent people caught by stray bomblets or maiming farmers, children and other locals unfortunate enough to stumble across unexploded ones.

A sickening practical demonstration of the effects that cluster munitions produce long after fighting ends, is visible in Southern Lebanon where ‘bomblets’ dispersed by Israeli forces during their 2006 conflict with Hezbollah continue to claim the lives and limbs of Lebanese civilians, including youngsters who frequently mistake them for toys.  This tragic situation provided a key impetus for the Convention on Cluster Munitions – a treaty banning the weapons, which came into force last year after prolonged campaigning by groups such as the Cluster Munition Coalition.  Although this is only binding upon those states opting to ratify it, which currently number fifty-six and do not include either Thailand or Cambodia, it has nevertheless served to stigmatise the weapons and create a worldwide shift away from them.  Despite the protestations of states such as Israel and the USA, which respectively deem cluster munitions as “completely legal” and “legitimate”, Thailand’s deployment in February was the first and only since the Convention was originally opened to signatures in 2008.

Abhisit VejjajivaThis underscores the fast-and-loose attitude of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva and his administration towards human rights.  However, after deploying troops to murder protesters and allowing immigration authorities to cast refugees into the open sea, it is hardly surprising that they should add the inexcusable and unforgivable use of cluster munitions to their ever growing repertoire of abuse.  With an estimated 5000 Cambodians now at risk from the unexploded bomblets, the only way that the Thai government can begin to make amends for this specific act is to disclose all information concerning where the munitions were deployed and fund a clean-up operation…then sign the Convention on Cluster Munitions and destroy their remaining stockpile.  Nothing less is acceptable.

Monday, 4 April 2011

What now for Côte d'Ivoire?

UN Ivory CoastMore than four months after Laurent Gbagbo lost the Côte d'Ivoire Presidential election yet chose to hold onto power through violence, the UN peacekeeping force stationed in the country is finally taking physical steps to dislodge him.  Of course their strikes on military bases and Gbagbo’s own compound are formally a response to the massacres of civilians and the shooting of eleven peacekeepers by Gbagbo’s troops over the past week (regime change is not within the force’s mandate), but no one is in any doubt that they are intended to assist the troops of democratically elected and internationally recognised President Alassane Ouattara – who claim to be just hours away from taking the main city of Abidjan.

Sadly this is in many ways too little too late.  Back in November 2010, as soon as Gbagbo’s plans to extend his decade long rule through the barrel of a gun became clear, there were widespread calls for international intervention.  Yet the African Union – still relatively week and weighed down with fighting in Somalia, was nowhere to be seen.  The regional Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was left largely impotent by its most powerful member- Nigeria- being in the midst of its own election campaigns.  And the broader international community, still pre-occupied with Iraq, Afghanistan and later the Arab Revolutions, was reluctant to bolster the existing UN force or strengthen its mandate.

The result was a long stand-off peppered with death squads, shootings and an outflow of refugees that eventually hit crisis level.  Then, seemingly left without any other recourse, Ouattara’s troops began a rapid military advance to take control of the country once and for all.  The North-South civil war that the election was meant to mark a final break from virtually reignited; racial and religious divisions continued to meld with the politicaIvory Coast Massacre.jpgl ones; and on Saturday some one thousand people were slaughtered in the town of Duekoue.       

Perhaps the greatest tragedy in all of this is that Ouattara’s troops were undoubtedly involved in that massacre (probably as the main perpetrators) as well as numerous other such war crimes.  Thus, even if the UN succeeds in helping to remove Gbagbo – as in now almost inevitable – Ouattara will come to power not on the back of a democratic election, as could have been the case, but on the back of barbarity and murder.  Furthermore, the tensions that have been allowed to build up over the past four months, will almost certainly result in revenge attacks on those who stood by Gbagbo – a situation that, owning to the tribally and religiously tainted politics of Côte d'Ivoire, could rapidly spiral into ethnic cleansing.

It goes without saying that this was never going to be an easy transition and that even if the international community had helped to force Gbagbo out immediately after the election, tensions between the two sides would still have turned violent.  However, the human cost and the country’s future prospects have unarguably been cast far bleaker by the long power struggle that has taken place.

The big issue now is what happens next.  Neighbouring states, most likely swayed by the huge refugee influxes that they are facing, have begun to discuss intervention to aid stabilisation, whilst mass media coverage (and the chilling echoes of Rwanda) have strengthened support for broader international assistance.  However these developments could come in many forms and from many different angles.  It will be tempting to prioritise stability over justice but both will be needed in the long-run.  Individuals and ethnic groups aligned to Gbagbo– whatever their crimes, must not be allowed to become victims of extra-judicial purges; whilst Ouattara, though the democratically elected leader, must be held to account for any war crimes that his troops have committed.  The world must learn from the mistake of giving Paul Kagame a free hand to terrorize Rwanda after his troops liberated the country in 1994; but on the other hand, serving Ouattara with an ICC arrest warrant the day after his inauguration could simply cast Côte d'Ivoire back into further turmoil.

With the peace process clearly in tatters, the old dictator exiting in an orgy of violence and the new leader riding to victory on the back of crimes against humanity the only certainty is that Côte d'Ivoire’s toughest times are still to come.

Ivory Coast Fire

Friday, 1 April 2011

Justice for Gaza means justice IN Gaza

When Israeli commandos murdered nine activists trying to deliver supplies to Gaza just under a year ago, criticism from many quarters of the international community was unjustifiably slow and restrained.  Yet even compared to that response, the silence following the death sentence passed by Hamas against a Palestinian civilian this week has been deafening.  Notably, many of the individuals and organisations who quickly and admirably stand up for the rights of Palestinians when Israeli forces commit abuses, are now nowhere to be seen.   

The man due to be killed was accused of collaborating with Israel- one of three capital crimes in the Gaza strip (the others being drug trafficking and murder).  His co-defendant, also found guilty of collaboration was sentenced to fifteen years hard labour.  As if the practice of hanging people or effectively torturing them for over a decade was not repulsive enough – the broader legislative and political context of these judgements underscores the brutality to which Hamas is subjecting its own people.   

HamasSince the group took over the Gaza strip in 2007, it has tried civilians in military courts –drawing significant criticism from human rights organisations.  These authoritarian courts, where the odds are stacked against defendants and international fair trial standards are not even touched upon, have been passing death sentences with increasing frequency, last year moving Palestine from a position of carrying out no formal executions since 2006 to becoming the 12th largest user of capital punishment in the world.

There is also a distinct likelihood that these executions are aimed atPalestine Protest quashing domestic discord.  Over the past weeks Gaza has been rocked by numerous demonstrations calling for Palestinian unity and in some cases denouncing Hamas’ poor governing record.  Palestinian civilians taking part and journalists covering the events have received vicious beatings at the hands of the Hamas police force, illustrating their scale of concern over rising dissent.  Particularly worrying for the Hamas authorities, especially in light of the prominent role played by the internet in the Arab revolutions, is the continuing growth of the Gaza Youth Manifesto for Change support base– an online movement denouncing Hamas and Fatah as well as Israel.  When considering this overall growth in dissent both on the web and on the streets, the attraction of using executions to take-out key opponents or spread fear amongst the population is immediately apparent.

On this basis there is a strong likelihood that this week’s ‘collaborators’ and those convicted before them are actually innocent victims – punished for standing up in support of Palestinian rights rather than aiding Israeli aggression.  Of course, the closed and secretive military courts make this impossible to verify one way or another.

Such circumstances hugely undermine those who justify their lack of criticism directed towards Hamas on the basis that it is the ‘democratically elected ruling party of Gaza’.  Whilst debate will continue to rage indefinitely about the fairness of the 2006 elections, it is undeniable that equally, if not more important, than a party’s means of coming power, is its behaviour when it gets there.  Beating up protestors and using rigged legal systems to impose politically-driven death sentences is neither democratic nor in the interests of the Palestinian people.  It only adds to the well documented and utterly appalling approach of Hamas leaders to women and homosexuals in highlighting how the group brings further misery to Gaza.

Now more than ever therefore, those who claim to support the Palestinian people should firmly align themselves with those protesting on the streets of Gaza by condemning Hamas loudly and clearly.  Resolutely denouncing the Hamas administration is not at all incompatible with denouncing Israel’s abuses against the Palestinian people – in fact it is nothing short of essential, as there can never be justice FOR Gaza until there justice IN Gaza- and that currently seems a long way off.  Silence now is unacceptable. 

Hamas Police

Friday, 25 March 2011

Museveni’s Gestapo

Ugandan despot Yoweri Museveni has long convinced the international community to overlook his human right violations by combining foreign diplomacy –including military action against Islamist insurgents in Somalia, with domestic distractions -by widely publicising (and some would argue indirectly maintaining) the abhorrent LRA rebellion that originated in Uganda’s Northern Acholi region.

Yet despite winning a new term in office through a little-criticised though flagrantly rigged election last month, Museveni’s slippery political manoeuvres are seemingly beginning to come unstuck.  On Monday he joined with the likes of Robert Mugabe to openly condemn military intervention in Libya – a move sure to agonise his tacit backers in Europe and the USA.  To make things worse, the tyrant’s rambling article, published in the Ugandan press, included a number of frankly ludicrous assertions, including a homage to Gaddafi’s road-building programme:

“When I was last there, I could see good roads even from the air.
From the TV pictures, you can even see the rebels zooming up and down in pick-up vehicles on very good roads accompanied by Western journalists. Who built these good roads?”

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Opposing the well-supported and UN mandated intervention that stopped a massacre in Benghazi –especially on account of tarmac quality- will do little to endear Museveni to the powerful ‘Western’ backers he relies upon, even as he continues win their favour by leading military commitment in Somalia.

And any fall from favour can only be exacerbated by the damning Human Rights Watch report released on Wednesday, detailing a litany of abuses by his Rapid Response Unit (RRU) – a specialist section of the Ugandan police force.  The RRU originated as Operation Wembley-a unit set up by Museveni in 2002 (officially to combat armed crime) that quickly gained an infamous reputation for genital mutilation and murder of those it detained.  Although it subsequently underwent two names changes, becoming the Violent Crime Crack Unit (VCCU) before the RRU, the evidence meticulously presented by Human Rights Watch shows that its barbaric practices have remained.

In a style eerily reminiscent of the Gestapo, the elite polite unit lifts people from the street without charge or trial, then takes them to isolated buildings where they subjected to various tortures including vicious beatings and the removal of fingernails.  Frequently, the victims are then summarily executed – with the number of judicial killings running into double figures during the past year alone.  Tellingly it is not just those accused of crime who are abducted by the RRU; journalists critical of Museveni and witnesses of police abuses have similarly been ‘disappeared’.  RRU thugs are also despatched to oversee elections, intimidating voters with both their reputation and physical violence.

This brutal circumvention of due legal process, free speech, accountability and democracy will be difficult to ignore, even for those who find Museveni a useful ‘asset’ in Central Africa.  RRU actions do not only directly contravene the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Convention Against Torture and  African Charter on Human and People’s Rights but at least seven other treaties to which Uganda is a signatory including those concerning fair trials, treatment of prisoners and use of force.  Perhaps more significantly still, the unit’s practices routinely violate the Ugandan constitution. 

Museveni- once lauded as a new kind of African leader, has spent  his leadership criticising former Ugandan dictators such as Idi Amin and Milton Obote, whilst becoming ever more abusive himself.  For too long the world has turned a blind eye to his true colours, but his public denouncement of humanitarian intervention combined with a timely report on his domestic oppression may potentially change this course. For the sake of the Ugandan people we can only hope that it does. 

Tuesday, 22 March 2011

Srebrenica to Benghazi

Somewhat predictably, from the very first mention of military intervention in Libya, the usual suspects were trotting the same old opposition lines.  The Stop the War Coalition hastily organised a rally, the Socialist Workers Party printed out leaflets and George Galloway popped up on Sky News.  However, whilst many of the anti-interventionist concerns are at least partly understandable and in many cases compassion for the Libyan people appears genuine, none of the arguments currently levelled against action really stand up to any scrutiny.

‘The West is just in it for oil’ is perhaps the most fequent  and nonsensical claim, churned out by those who ignore the fact that the most prominent states in the coalition import relatively little of their oil from Libya, with the overall supply of Libyan crude making up just 2% of the world’s total.  Of course contracts in Libya are still worth billions of dollars to many ‘Western’ companies and certain states including Italy are more reliant on these than others, but this is hardly a motive for intervention– after all, he was already providing the oil, working with companies such as BP and showed no signs of cutting it off.  If anything, Libyan oil would have been an incentive to keep Gaddafi in place, just as tacit or active support has been given to other despots in return for their energy supplies.

Which leads us nicely to the anti-interventionists’ next point – ‘hypocrisy!’  They point out that although Zimbabwe, Burma and Tibet all languish under barbaric regimes we haven’t seen any intervention in these cases.  And right now state violence against demonstrators is rapidly increasing in the Ivory Coast, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia but there is no talk of airstrikes or no fly zones over these states.  In fact, in several of these situations ‘Western’ governments and state-supported arms dealers are continuing to prop up the tyrants in power.  These are of course perfectly valid points, that should be loudly articulated by members of the public in democratic states …but they do not explain why intervention shouldn’t take place in Libya.  Just because our governments have left the people of other states to be ruthlessly slaughtered, why should we then try to stop them when they finally do decide to take action? 

A similar rebuff can be raised against the cries of ‘look at what happened in Iraq/Afghanistan.’  Whilst almost no one denies that these ventures – for whatever reason – have proved largely disastrous, they should not invalidate any future intervention.  And by going through the UN Security Council, explicitly rejecting occupation and taking significant precautions in the execution of air attacks, the coalition forces are demonstrating that lessons have been learnt from past mistakes.

So the argument turns to claims that ‘we have enough problems at home and not enough money to spend on intervention’ or in the words of Galloway – the situation in Libya is not tantamount to ‘our justifiable interests.’  Such sentiments are easy to express when you’re sitting in the UK and your biggest worry is the local library closing – they are far harder to reconcile when you’re in Libya with your family facing the full onslaught of Gaddafi’s troops.

And thus we are left with objections based on the risk of civilian casualties and the practical effectiveness of intervention, perhaps the strongest foundation of the anti-interventionist case.  Yet whilst these fears are most certainly justified, the predictions of numerous innocent causalities have so far been unfounded.  As would be expected, Gaddafi has made claims of mass civilian deaths resulting from airstrikes, but despite controlling state television and access to hundreds of journalists his regime has yet to show any evidence of this.  In the East it has been confirmed that a handful of civilians were injured as US troops sought to rescue their downed airmen, yet several of the wounded have openly expressed support for the intervention – stressing that their injuries are a small price to pay for coalition forces halting Gaddafi’s advance.

And it is precisely the halting of Gaddafi’s advance that stands above all arguments in justifying international military action.  In 1995 the fall of Srebrenica, as the world stood by, resulted in the summary execution of over eight thousand Bosniaks (left).  There is no doubt the had coalition forces not intervened in Libya when they did, Benghazi would have fallen in the same way.  Given the live burials, burnings, mutilations and executions (right) that have befallen those resisting Gaddafi so far, his ominous pledge to show no mercy when his forces reached the rebel capital would have inevitably been realised with unrestrained barbarism.  To a great extent this fact alone justifies intervention regardless of the wider context and concerns addressed here.

Of course criticism is important to asses, free speech is a fundamental right even when we disagree with it and the wider questions of long-term strategy, norms of intervention and the situation in other states must be addressed.  But tonight Benghazi is still on the map, its residents are still alive and Gadaffi has been prevented from carrying out the slaughter that he was so desperate for  -and came so near to achieving.  No ill-founded arguments about oil, past-form or domestic supremacy should detract from that.

 

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Blasphemy and death in Pakistan

Nearly three weeks on from the callous murder of Shahbaz Bhatti, minority communities in Pakistan are still mourning the loss of their most prominent and determined advocate. For over two decades Bhatti had fought relentlessly to overturn oppressive blasphemy laws, end religious apartheid and create a pluralistic, tolerant state. His All Pakistan Minorities Alliance combined patriotism with respect for the traditions, beliefs and cultures of all Pakistani groups and his appointment as Minister for Minorities Affairs in 2008 led to genuine advances – including a quota for minorities in government jobs and reserved seats for minorities in the Senate, despite opposition from the rest of the government and numerous extremist groups.

Ultimately though, he knew that these successes would cost him his life and on March 2nd the worst fears of Ahmadis, Christians, Hindus, Shiites, Zikiris and other Pakistani minorities came to pass. Since then the violence has only continued, with the mysterious death of a Christian held in custody on charges of blasphemy and the unprovoked murder of an Ahmadiyya in Sindh Province being amongst the more high-profile sectarian incidents in the past week alone.

Of course religious persecution is nothing new in Pakistan. The vile blasphemy legislation still being used to pass death sentences against those accused of insulting Islam originated under colonial rule before being strengthened in the 1980s by dictator Zia Al-Huq. Similarly, the designation of Ahmadis as non-Muslims that is at the root of so much violence today, stems from the 1970s rule of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto – the man widely regarded as the father of Pakistani democracy.

Ironically, the discrimination so efficiently executed by Bhutto, Al-Huq and subsequent Pakistani administrations including Zardari’s, has been a response to hardliners and fanatics – intended to placate them in the name of state stability- yet in practice it has had precisely the opposite effect. Beyond directly violating the human rights of minorities, the repressive laws, just as in Indonesia, have created an environment in which extremist groups actually flourish; allowing them to destroy religious buildings and carry out brutal massacres. Ali Eteraz succinctly and accurately describes how “the blasphemy law now provides convenient protection to anyone who ever wants to kill, murder, maim, beat up, mug, abduct, or punish any religious minority. All you really have to do is carry out your brutality and then point at the victim and say that he was blasphemous.” This situation is exacerbated by the complicity of government officials and police in sectarian violence- cumulating in a desperate state of affairs where most political commentators accept that though the authorities almost certainly did not pull the trigger on Bhatti, they undoubtedly contributed to his death through demonising advocates of religious equality and encouraging inter-communal violence.

Tragically Bhatti’s murder was just one of manyimage signs that the persecution is worsening. Statistics demonstrate that 2009 was the worst year of oppression for Pakistani Ahmadis, until ninety-four were butchered in a single massacre during 2010. The exodus of Hindus into India is also growing and violent attacks against Christian communities appeared to be stepping up even before the nation’s only Christian Minister was killed. As the USA continues drone strikes against Taliban elements in Western Pakistan, Scotland’s Cardinal Keith O’Brien has called for conditions of religious freedom to be incorporated into UK-to-Pakistan aid; yet for all this international pressure, real progress can only come from a genuine shift in the Pakistani government’s mind-set. When Zardari and his administration finally accept that religious persecution increases extremism and turmoil rather than reducing it, then maybe –for the sake of stability if nothing else – official and legislative moves towards religious plurality may finally take place. Prior amongst these must be the repeal of blasphemy laws, recognition of Ahmadis as Muslims and a thorough restructuring of the police force. However, the bigoted school of thought that has dominated Pakistani politics for over half a century remains strong, making such moves currently unforeseeable. In post-Bhatti Pakistan, the outlook for minority groups is bleaker than ever.

Pakistan Blasphemy